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CASENOTE
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp. and
Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.: The
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in
Toxic Tort Litigation
Alex R. DeSevo
In toxic tort litigation, plaintiffs must ordinarily es-
tablish causation through the use of expert testimony.
This paper provides a discussion and analysis of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in Rubanick v.
Witco Chemical Corp. and Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.,
which broaden the standard governing the admissibility
of expert testimony in toxic tort litigation. The author
begins with a discussion of the "general acceptance"
standard and the cases leading up to Rubanick and Lan-
drigan. Next, the author analyzes and discusses the
Rubanick and Landrigan decisions, and the split be-
tween the federal circuits as to whether district courts
should "actively" or "passively" review expert testimony.
The author concludes by stating that other jurisdictions
should follow the Rubanick and Landrigan holdings in
determining the admissibility of scientific theories of
causation in toxic tort litigation.
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I. Introduction
In Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp." the New Jersey
Supreme Court set forth a new, broader standard for New
Jersey courts to use in determining the reliability of novel or
emerging scientific theories of causation.2 The Rubanick court
held "that in toxic-tort litigation, a scientific theory of causa-
tion that has not yet reached general acceptance may be
found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, ade-
quately-founded scientific methodology involving data and in-
formation of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the
scientific field." s Further, in Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.," the
court reaffirmed Rubanick, and explained that "[tihe admissi-
bility of such testimony depends on the expert's ability to ex-
plain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those princi-
ples to the formulation of his or her opinion" and "the key to
admission of the opinion is the validity of the expert's reason-
ing and methodology."
The New Jersey Supreme Court has thus recognized the
difficult burden facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation6
in toxic tort7 litigation.8 Ordinarily, plaintiffs establish causa-
tion by showing a reasonable connection between the defend-
1. 593 A.2d' 733 (N.J. 1991).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 747-48.
4. 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992).
5. Id. at 1084.
6. Legal cause or proximate cause is defined as a "[slubstantial factor in bringing
about harm." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 893 (6th ed. 1990).
7. Two commentators have defined toxic tort cases as:
those in which the plaintiff seeks compensation for harm allegedly caused by
exposure to a substance that increases the risk of contracting a serious dis-
ease, but does not cause an immediately apparent response. These cases gen-
erally involve a period of latency or incubation prior to the onset of the dis-
ease. In most cases the increased risk of the disease does not diminish or
dissipate, even with the cessation of exposure.
Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 733 n.1 (1984).
8. See also Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 298-302, (N.J. 1987)(large
class of plaintiffs brought suit against township for damage caused by toxic pollutants
from landfill which contaminated plaintiffs' well water). See generally James F.
O'Brien, Note, Ayers v. Township of Jackson: Damages for the Enhanced Risk of
Future Disease, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257 (1987).
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ant's act and the plaintiff's resulting injury.9 The primary fac-
tor that distinguishes toxic tort litigation from more
traditional tort causes of action is the difficulty of proving
causation, which almost always necessitates the use of expert
testimony.'0 Toxic tort cases require expert testimony because
jurors are usually unable to fully understand the link between
exposure to a toxin and a subsequent injury without expert
explanation." In fact, almost every jurisdiction now requires
toxic tort plaintiffs to prove causation through expert testi-
mony."2 Plaintiff's difficulty is exacerbated, however, by de-
fense attorneys who attempt to rebut causation through op-
posing expert testimony.18
The inherent difficulty in proving causation arises be-
cause of the latency period between toxic exposure and the
resulting illness.' 4 Often, ten or twenty years may pass be-
tween exposure and subsequent illness.' 5 Consequently, toxic
tort plaintiffs may not realize they have been injured and may
not seek compensation until many years later, when the phys-
ical manifestations of their chemical exposure become appar-
ent." When there is a long latency period, plaintiffs typically
must prove that their illness is not the result of exposure to
other contaminants during this time period.'7
Also, toxic tort plaintiffs often encounter problems in ob-
9. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
10. See EDWARD GREER & WARREN FREEDMAN, Toxic TORT LITIGATION 5.1-5.3
(1989); see generally MARGIE TYLER SEARcY, A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS, § 6 (1992).
11. See Stanley Pierce et al., Expert Testimony in Technically Complex Litiga-
tion, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 429, 430 (1990).
12. See KATHLEEN A. TOUBY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION DESKBOOK
105 (1989).
13. Gary M. Zwain & Andrew D. Weinstock, How Scientists Can Help Attorneys
Defeat Speculative Toxic Tort Claims, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 711 (Nov. 6, 1991).
14. Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987).
15. See id.
16. Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal,
Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARv. ENvTL L. REV.
177, 191 (1983).
17. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 301; see, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317
F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963) (plaintiff unable to prove
that smoking was the sole cause of his lung cancer).
1992]
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taining evidence of causation because such evidence is usually
indirect.18 It frequently consists of an expert's opinion of cau-
sation, which is formed by applying the theories from relevant
scientific studies to the facts of the particular case. 19 However,
relying on expert opinions can be problematic because science
is slow to accept new theories of causation.2 0 For example,
scientists do not fully understand carcinogens and their ef-
fects. " One commentator has stated, "scientists do not yet
understand the molecular model of carcinogenesis, [making it]
impossible to state that a given carcinogen caused any indi-
vidual tumor. '22 Therefore, estimating the impact of exposure
from carcinogens is difficult and uncertain. 2s This uncertainty
typifies the difficulty of proving causation in toxic tort cases.
Part II of this note will provide a background of New
Jersey Rules of Evidence 19 and 56(2) and New Jersey Su-
preme Court decisions that set the standard for the admission
of expert testimony in toxic tort litigation. Parts III and IV
will set forth the facts and holdings of the Rubanick and Lan-
drigan proceedings in the Law Division, Appellate Division
and New Jersey Supreme Courts. The opposing positions
taken by different federal jurisdictions in determining a trial
court's role in making an independent evaluation of the relia-
bility of an expert's testimony are discussed in Part V. Part
VI will analyze the Rubanick and Landrigan decisions and
compare them to the standards applied in different federal ju-
risdictions. Finally, Part VII will conclude that state and fed-
18. Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 393-94 (1986).
19. One commentator discusses three specialties used in toxic tort litigation to
establish causation: "testimony of physicians specializing in public health, occupa-
tional, and preventive medicine; expert testimony based on toxicology; and expert
testimony based on epidemiological studies. None of these methods should be viewed
as exclusive." Edward T. Dangel, III, Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74
MAss. L. REV. 169, 174 (1989).
20. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of
Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469,
474-75 (1988).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 475.
23. Id. at 474-75.
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eral jurisdictions should follow Rubanick and Landrigan,
which broaden the standard governing the admission of expert
testimony in toxic tort litigation.
II. Background
A. New Jersey Rules of Evidence 19 and 56(2)
New Jersey Rule of Evidence 56(2)24 governs the admissi-
bility of expert testimony, and is almost identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 703.25 Rule of Evidence 56(2) allows wit-
nesses, qualified under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 1926 as
experts due to their "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education," to testify as to their opinions on matters "requir-
ing scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. 2 7 Pur-
24. New Jersey Rule of Evidence 56(2) states:
A witness qualified pursuant to Rule 19 as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education may testify in the form of opinion or other-
wise as to matters requiring scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge if such testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or determine a fact in issue. The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
N.J.R. EviD. 56(2).
25. Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A.2d 1241, 1247 (N.J. 1990). Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
26. New Jersey Rule of Evidence 19 states:
As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness there must be evidence that
he has personal knowledge of the matter, or experience, training, or educa-
tion, if such be required. Such evidence may be provided by the testimony of
the witness himself. The judge may reject the testimony of a witness that he
perceived a matter if he finds that no trier of fact could reasonably believe
that the witness did perceive the matter. In exceptional circumstances the
judge may receive the testimony of the witness conditionally, subject to the
evidence of knowledge, experience, training or education being later supplied
in the course of the trial.
N.J.R. EVID. 19.
27. N.J.R. EviD. 56(2).
5
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suant to Rule 56(2), the court is further required to determine
if an expert's data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field in forming opinions."2 8
B. Prior Cases - Kelly, Windmere, & Ryan
Prior to Rubanick, New Jersey courts relied on a "con-
ventional test" in determining the admissibility of expert tes-
timony." The conventional test required an expert opinion to
have been "generally accepted" in the applicable scientific
community.30 New Jersey's "conventional" test has its origins
in the D.C. Circuit's decision in Frye v. United States,3"
which developed the "general acceptance" test for the admis-
sion of evidence, requiring an expert's opinion to be generally
accepted within a particular scientific field. It was this con-
ventional test which the trial court in Rubanick applied, hold-
ing that "general acceptance" requires "accept[ance] by at
least a substantial minority of the applicable scientific
community."32
In State v. Kelly,33 the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
sidered whether expert testimony about the "battered-wo-
man's syndrome" was admissible to support a claim of self-
defense in a homicide case." The court held that, to be admis-
sible, expert opinion "must be at a state of the art such that
an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable."35 The
opinion will be held reliable if it is "generally accepted" in the
scientific community.3 General acceptance can be proven
through the testimony of knowledgeable experts, authoritative
scientific literature, or judicial decisions. 7
28. Id.
29. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 735 (N.J. 1991).
30. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 542 A.2d 975, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1988).
31. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
32. Id. at 983.
33. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
34. Id. at 368.
35. Id. at 379.
36. See id. at 380.
37. Id.
[Vol. 10
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In Windmere, Inc. v. International Insurance Co.," the
court considered the admissibility of voiceprints as "reliable
scientific tools for determining the identity of a human
voice. '"" The court recognized the difficulty of establishing
"general acceptance, ' 0 yet reaffirmed the requirement.41 The
Windmere test is similar to the test articulated in Frye v.
United States,'2 which required "general acceptance."4 3 The
Windmere test, like the Frye test, admits an expert's opinion
only if the opinion has gained such acceptance in the scientific
community.'4 The Windmere court specified three ways to
prove "general acceptance": "[1] the testimony of knowledge-
able experts; [2] authoritative scientific literature; and [31 per-
suasive judicial decisions which acknowledge such general ac-
ceptance of expert testimony.'
' 5
In Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools Inc.," the plaintiff brought
a products liability suit against a pool manufacturer for inju-
ries incurred in a diving accident.' 7 The plaintiff alleged that
the diving board was unsafe given the depth of the pool, and
offered expert testimony in support of his allegation.'8 The
opinion of defendant's engineering expert was supported by a
body of statistics gathered from the expert's own investiga-
tion.' e The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the issue of
38. 522 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1987).
39. Id. at 406.
40. See id. at 408.
41. Id. at 407-08.
42. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test allows the admission of expert
testimony when a scientific principle or discovery has "gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. General acceptance occurs when
a scientific principle ceases to be experimental and becomes demonstrable.
Windmere, 522 A.2d at 407 n.2.
43. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp. 576 A.2d 4, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990)(Havey, J., dissenting); Ronald J. Fleury, Criteria Broadened for Toxic Tort
Experts, 125 N.J.L.J. 1587, 1609 (1990).
44. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Windmere, 522 A.2d at 407.
45. Windmere, 522 A.2d at 408.
46. 579 A.2d 1241 (N.J. 1990). See generally Brian Simon, Note, The Basis of
Expert Testimony: Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools Lets the Expert Have Their Way, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 1235 (1991).
47. Id. at 1242.
48. Id. at 1243.
49. Id. at 1244.
1992]
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the admissibility of the expert's opinion to the trial court,60
and held that New Jersey Rule of Evidence 56(2) "require[s]
that a court make an inquiry into and a finding on whether
experts in the given field rely on certain information. 1 If such
reliance can be found then it is presumed to be reasonable.""
One commentator has called Rubanick the first progeny of
Ryan."
III. Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp.
A. Facts
In Rubanick, the estates of two deceased employees
brought wrongful death actions against an employer and man-
ufacturer for the decedents' alleged toxic exposure. Ronald G.
Rubanick worked for Witco Chemical Corporation from 1974
until 1979, when he was diagnosed as suffering from colon
cancer. 4 Mr. Rubanick died from cancer in 1980 at the age of
twenty-nine." Anthony DeMaio, the other decedent in the
case, was a thirty-year Witco employee who was also diag-
nosed as suffering from colon cancer.6 He died at the age of
fifty-two.57
The survivors of each employee brought separate suits,
which were consolidated for appeal." The plaintiffs claimed
that the decedents' exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) while on the job caused decedents' colon cancer,
which resulted in their deaths." One of the defendants, Mon-
santo Company, sold PCB fluids to Witco from 1969 until
1976.60
50. Id. at 1248.
51. Id. at 1247.
52. Id.
53. Ronald B. Grayzel, Tort La
54. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. C
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Rubanick v. Witco Chem.
1990).
59. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 734.
60. Id. at 735.
w, 129 N.J.L.J. 105, 106 (1991).
Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 735 (N.J. 1991).
Corp., 576 A.2d 4, 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
[Vol. 10
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Monsanto Company made a motion for a pre-trial hearing
to assess the qualifications of the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Earl
Balis.61 Monsanto contended that Dr. Balis's opinions were
not supported by the scientific community.6 2 The court was
thus confronted with the issue of how to determine the relia-
bility of novel or emerging scientific theories of causation."
Dr. Balis holds a doctorate in biochemistry and for thirty-
seven years has been a primary cancer researcher at the
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City.4 A former
chairman of the Department of Biochemistry of Cornell Uni-
versity Medical College, 65 Dr. Balis has been involved in the
publication of approximately 170 scientific articles, fifteen of
which concerned carcinogenesis." Dr. Balis was not a treating
physician and did not examine either of the decedents. 7 His
opinion regarding the cause of the decedents' illness was
based on five factors: 1) the extremely low incidence of cancer
in males under thirty years of age; 2) decedents' personal his-
tory; 3) other Witco employees' contraction of cancer; 4) the
large body of evidence showing that PCBs produce cancer in
experimental animals; and 5) thirteen articles on the effects of
PCB exposure on animals and humans, which Dr. Balis
claimed supported his opinion that PCBs are human
carcinogens."
Despite Dr. Balis's credentials and experience, his view
that PCB exposure can cause cancer in humans does not yet
have full support within the scientific community. 9 The de-
61. Id.'
62. Defendant's experts were asked whether they were "'aware of any recognized
valid scientific opinion, either as a consensus or as a substantial minority opinion,
which would recognize PCBs as a causative factor in human cancer.'" All three ex-
perts answered no. Id. at 737.
63. Id. at 739.
64. Id. at 735.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 735-36.
69. Id. at 736
The trial court asked Dr. Balis whether his theory that PCBs cause cancer in
human beings finds support in the scientific community. Answering that
most of the scientific community 'pays [no] attention to PCBs whatsoever,'
1992]
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fendant produced three experts ° who refuted Dr. Balis's the-
ory.71 These conflicting expert opinions required the court to
evaluate its role in determining the admissibility of an ex-
pert's opinion in toxic tort litigation. 2
B. Law Division
In Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp.,8 the trial court
held that the plaintiffs' expert's testimony was inadmissible
because the expert's theory of causation had not been gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community.74 The trial court de-
termined that the "general acceptance" standard established
by cases such as Frye and Windmere required that the basis
of the expert's opinion be "accepted by at least a substantial
minority of the applicable scientific community."' "5 In holding
Dr. Balis's opinion inadmissible, 6 the court noted that Dr.
Balis's theory had never been "accepted in any state-or fed-
eral court in the United States."' 7 The court further stated
that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert "as to acceptance
of PCBs as human carcinogens is wholly lacking. '7 8
C. Appellate Division
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision
Dr. Balis noted that thirteen of the thirty-nine papers he had reviewed on
the subject supported his opinion.
Id.
70. Dr. Thomas Fahey is a licensed physician and board certified internist, and
the deputy physician in charge of the Memorial Hospital at the Sloan-Kettering Can-
cer Institute and Associate Dean of Medicine at Cornell University Medical College.
Dr. Raymond Harbison holds a Ph.D. in toxicology and a degree in pharmacology. He
is the Director of Toxicology at the University of Arkansas in conjunction with the
National Center for Toxicological Research. Dr. Philip Cole is an expert epidemiolo-
gist who is also a licensed medical doctor. Dr. Cole holds a Ph.D. from the Harvard
School of Public Health, where he is a full professor. Id. at 736-37.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 739.
73. 542 A.2d 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
74. Id. at 984.
75. Id. at 983.
76. Id. at 975.
77. Id: at 981.
78. Id. at 983.
[Vol. 10
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and remanded the case for trial."9 The divided panel did not
reach a uniform conclusion or analysis by which to resolve the
standard governing the admissibility of expert opinion evi-
dence in toxic tort litigation.80 Nevertheless, all three judges
agreed that the trial court's conventional standard, requiring
that the expert's opinion be accepted by at least a substantial
minority of the scientific community, was too strict."
1. Lead Opinion
In the lead opinion, Judge Petrella held that non-medical
experts such as Dr. Balis may be qualified to testify regarding
novel opinions of causation based on the adequate education,
training, or experience of the expert, unless the opinion is "il-
logical, outlandish or totally speculative."" The court adopted
the reasoning of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,8s and held
that a well-reasoned opinion of causation is admissible, even if
the opinion has not been generally accepted in the scientific
community. " Judge Petrella held that Dr. Balis was an expert
whose knowledge, training, and experience qualified him to
testify as to the development of cancer in medical subjects.8
Further, Dr. Balis did not have to examine the plaintiff to ex-
press his scientific opinion regarding the plaintiff's contrac-
tion of colon cancer.8 6
2. Concurrence
Judge Stern agreed with both the lead opinion and dis-
sent that a broader standard is required when an expert testi-
fies as to causation in toxic tort litigation.8 He disagreed with
79. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 576 A.2d 4, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990).
80. See id. at 15-16 (Stern, J., concurring); Grayzel, supra note 53, at 107-08.
81. See Rubanick, 576 A.2d at 15.
82. 576 A.2d 4, 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
83. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
84. Rubanick, 576 A.2d at 13.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id. at 16. Judge Stern reasoned that under the present standard Christopher
Columbus could not give expert opinion on navigation and the Wright Brothers could
1992]
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the lead opinion's holding that Dr. Balis's opinion was admis-
sible, but voted to remand because upon further proof, Judge
Stern believed that the plaintiffs at trial might be able to pro-
duce other evidence to support and render reliable Dr. Balis's
opinion as to causation.8 Judge Stern, like Judge Havey in
the dissent, determined that Dr. Balis's opinion in the in
limine hearings was inadmissible."' Judge Stern reasoned,
however, that the plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to
present the proof necessary to sustain the admission of the
plaintiffs' expert's opinion.9
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Havey agreed with the lead opinion
that admission into evidence of an expert's opinion as to cau-
sation need not be dependent upon "general acceptance" of
the expert's underlying theory.92 However, he found that a
well-reasoned expert opinion must find "at least some conclu-
sive support in the scientific community" to be admissible.93
Judge Havey rejected the strict "general acceptance" stan-
dard, holding that "an opinion as to causation must be accom-
plished on a case-by-case basis because of the fact-specific na-
not give expert opinion related to flying because "for much of their day, their views
never gained 'general acceptance within the scientific community'." Id. at 15.
88. Id. at 16.
89. New Jersey Rule of Evidence 8(1) states:
When the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility of
evidence, or the existence of a privilege is stated in these rules to be subject
to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, that issue is to
be determined by the judge. In his determination the rules of evidence shall
not apply except for Rule 4 or a valid claim of privilege. The judge shall
indicate to the parties which one has the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of proof on such issue as implied by the rule under which the
question arises. The judge may hear and determine such matters out of the
presence or hearing of the jury. This rule shall not be construed to limit the
right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or
credibility.
N.J.R. EVID. 8(1).
90. See Rubanick, 576 A.2d at 16.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. (emphasis in original).
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ture of each case."' 4 The dissenting opinion would not,
therefore, admit conclusions unsupported by factual evi-
dence, 95 and would require "a factual and scientific basis suffi-
cient to meet the reliability threshold.""
D. New Jersey Supreme Court
In Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp.,9 the New Jersey
Supreme Court created a different, more flexible standard
with regard to expert testimony in toxic tort litigation." The
new standard will be used to determine the reliability of novel
or emerging scientific theories of causation. 9 Plaintiffs will
have a greater opportunity under this new standard to show a
causal link between toxic exposure and subsequent injuries.
Under this standard, courts will admit scientific theories
that have not gained general acceptance if they are based on
"sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving
data and information of the type reasonably relied on by ex-
perts in the scientific field."'100 Such evidence must be prof-
fered by an expert "who is sufficiently qualified by education,
knowledge, training, and experience in the specific field of sci-
ence." 101 The Rubanick court mandated that "[t]he expert
must possess a demonstrated professional capability to assess
the scientific significance of the underlying data and informa-
tion, to apply the scientific methodology, and to explain the
bases for the opinion reached."'0 2
94. Id.
95. Id. at 20.
96. Id.
97. 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
98. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 750; New Jersey Widens Admissibility of Toxic Tort
Scientific Evidence, 60 U.S.L.W. 1030 (Aug. 20, 1991); New Jersey High Court Ad-
mits Expert Evidence Even If Not Generally Accepted in Community, 6 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 330 (Aug. 14, 1991); Christopher M. Placitella, Toxic-Tort Litigation
Shapes New Expert-Witness Role, 126 N.J.L.J. 817 (1990); George W. Conk, New
Jersey Supreme Court Clears Way for Broader Use of Epidemiological and Other
Scientific Evidence, Civm TRIAL BAR SECTION NEWSLETrER (N.J. State Bar Ass'n,
New Brunswick, N.J.) Nov. 1991, at 2.
99. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 750.
100. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 747-48.
101. Id. at 748.
102. Id.
1992]
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The court recognized that several other jurisdictions have
adopted a "more flexible approach to the admission of causa-
tion theories in toxic-tort litigation." 103 It noted that those
courts do not use the general acceptance standard, but rather
look to "whether the scientific knowledge is sufficiently
founded or based on a sound methodology, leaving the deci-
sion to credit the theory to the finder of fact."10'
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus agreed with the rea-
soning of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.105 and Wells v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,' °6 which applied a "passive9
1 0
'
approach in reviewing expert testimony under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.108 The Rubanick court quoted Judge
Mikva's statement in Ferebee that "[j]udges, both trial and
appellate, have no special competence to resolve the complex
and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link low-
level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. 1 The
court recognized that a "methodology-based standard" is
needed to determine the reliability of emerging scientific theo-
ries of causation. 10
The Rubanick court also noted that some jurisdictions
have applied an "active" standard in determining the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence.1 The active standard discussed
in Johnston v. United States,1 12 In re "Agent Orange" Prod-
uct Liability Litigation,113  and Brock v. Merrell Dow
103. Id. at 741.
104. Id. at 741-42.
105. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). See dis-
cussion infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
106. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986). See
discussion infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
107. Throughout this article, the terms "passive" and "active" are used to de-
scribe the process by which courts review the admissibility of expert testimony. Other
commentators have variously used terms such as "liberal" and "conservative."
108. See Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 742-43.
109. Id. at 742 (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d at 1534).
110. Id. at 743.
111. Id. at 744-45.
112. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984). See discussion infra notes 211; 213-16 and
accompanying text.
113. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) cert.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence was, however, rejected by this court.115 In
rejecting the active approach, the court reasoned, "[w]e do not
believe that in determining the soundness of the methodology
the trial court should directly and independently determine as
a matter of law that a controversial and complex scientific
methodology is sound." ' e
The court held further that the approach of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Downing,"7
Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,"5 and In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litigation,"9 for determining the reliability of
novel scientific theories of causation is compatible with the
New Jersey Rules of Evidence. 20 This approach admits new
scientific evidence if the basis of the expert's testimony con-
sists of "facts or data... of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field," and if the expert's technique
or methodology in using the facts or data is well-founded.' 2'
Although the Rubanick court recognized the Third Circuit's
establishment of "two separate reliability determinations,"
the court declined to split the inquiry, stating that "we do not
believe that a rigid dichotomy is necessary. 122 Therefore, the
Rubanick court adopted a single reliability inquiry which ad-
dresses the underlying methodologies of both the scientific
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). See discussion infra notes 205-10 and accompanying
text.
114. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified on other grounds, 884 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990). See discussion infra notes 217-21; 224-
25 and accompanying text.
115. See Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 748-49.
116. Id at 748.
117. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). See discussion infra notes 186-89; 191-94 and
accompanying text.
118. 926 F.2d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 1991) (expert testimony using traditional meth-
ods such as blood tests, liver function tests, and gas chromatograph tests to sustain
expert's opinion that PCBs cause bladder cancer held admissible because though the
opinion was novel, the methods were not).
119. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). See discus-
sion infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
120. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 746.
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)).
122. Id. at 747.
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data and the reasoning which lead to the formulation of the
expert's opinion.
IV. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.
A. Facts
The plaintiff, Angelina Landrigan, sued defendants
Owen-Corning Fiberglass Corp. and Celotex Corp. for the per-
sonal injuries and death of her husband. 1 3 For sixteen years,
the decedent had allegedly worked with asbestos-based insula-
tion."2 4 In her suit, plaintiff claimed her husband's exposure to
defendants' asbestos had caused him to contract colon cancer
which resulted in his death.'"5 In December of 1981, he was
diagnosed as suffering from colon cancer; he died one year
later. 26
At trial, plaintiff offered the expert opinions of Dr. Jo-
seph Sokolowski, Jr., a physician who is board certified in
both internal medicine and pulmonary medicine, and Dr. Jo-
seph K. Wagoner, who is an epidemiologist and biostatis-
tician, but is not a physician."2 7 Though Dr. Sokolowski never
treated the decedent, he based his conclusion that asbestos
exposure caused decedent's colon cancer on decedent's "'his-
tory of occupational exposure, the absence of other risk fac-
tors and the epidemiological evidence in the literature,'" ad-
ding, "'there is no other predisposing factor for the
occurrence of carcinoma of the colon in an individual who is
the age of Mr. Landrigan.' "128 In addition, he testified gener-
ally that asbestos can cause colon cancer.2 9 The trial court
determined, however, that his testimony did not establish the
requisite causation between decedent's colon cancer and expo-
sure to defendants' asbestos. 130
123. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1082 (N.J. 1992).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 579 A.2d 1268, 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1269.
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Plaintiff also offered Dr. Wagoner to testify that asbestos
exposure caused decedent's colon cancer. 13 1 However, the trial
court, after a Rule 8 hearing, 32 determined that Dr. Wagoner
was not qualified to testify that asbestos caused decedent's co-
lon cancer. 133 Nevertheless, the trial court did permit him to
testify as to his general opinion that asbestos exposure causes
colon cancer and that studies have linked colon cancer to as-
bestos exposure.' 34
B. Appellate Division
The plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal for fail-
ure to establish proximate cause.' The Appellate Division af-
firmed the trial court, holding that Dr. Sokolowski's testimony
failed to establish causation."36 The court stated: "Dr. Soko-
lowski made no allowance for the presence of other causes
which have not yet been identified by medical science but
which, as he acknowledged, account for most cases of colon
cancer.""37 The Appellate Court pointed out that, based on
the record, there was no basis upon which a jury might find a
causal relationship between decedent's colon cancer and expo-
sure to asbestos."' The court reasoned, "[d]ecedent's occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos fibers during his life, while a suspi-
cious circumstance, does not supply its own incriminating link
to decedent's last illness, and the fact that causation cannot
be reasonably demonstrated by presently available evidence is
no justification for allowing a jury to guess its way to such a
result.""- 9
At trial, the plaintiff had also offered Dr. Joseph Wag-
oner, an epidemiologist and biostatistician, as an expert on
131. Id.
132. See supra note 89.
133. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1082-83 (N.J. 1992).
134. Id. at 1083.
135. 579 A.2d 1268, 1269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
136. See id. at 1274.
137. Id. at 1270.
138. Id. at 1274.
139. Id.
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causation. 140 The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's
exclusion of Dr. Wagoner's testimony as to causation and held
that his qualifications "did not endow his opinion as to proxi-
mate cause with the expertise necessary to 'assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or determine [the] fact in is-
sue.' ,141 Dr. Wagoner was qualified to give his opinion on
"the relationship between asbestos exposure and the develop-
ment of colon cancer, but not as to whether asbestos fiber was
the causative agent of decedent's illness. 1' 42 The Appellate
Division thus distinguished Dr. Wagoner's experience from
Dr. Balis's experience in the Rubanick case.1"
C. New Jersey Supreme Court
In Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.,44 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court attempted to further define the standard gov-
erning the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort liti-
gation. The court held that, at a Rule 8 hearing,1 45
epidemiologists and other experts "must be able to identify
the factual bases for their conclusions, explain their methodol-
ogy, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the
methodology are scientifically reliable." 46 The trial court
must then evaluate this explanation and determine whether
the opinion assists in determining a fact in issue or whether it
is " 'junk science.' 17
The Landrigan Court explained that New Jersey Rule of
Evidence 56(2) requires expert testimony to be reliable, and
the witness must be qualified to offer the testimony.1 48 In re-
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1275. "In our view, [Dr. Balis's] background in the physical sciences
was materially different from the experience and training of Dr. Wagoner whose in-
terest in the subject of carcinogenesis is that of a statistician." Id.
144. 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992).
145. See supra note 89.
146. Id. at 1086.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1084.
The Rule imposes three basic requirements: (1) the intended testimony must
concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the
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affirming Rubanick, the court further explained that the ad-
missibility of expert testimony focuses on "the validity of the
expert's reasoning and methodology.""" When determining
the admissibility of expert testimony, courts must "examine
the manner in which experts reason from the studies and
other information to a conclusion. '150
On remand, the Landrigan trial court must evaluate Dr.
Sokolowski's testimony as to the validity of both the studies
he relied on and of his subsequent assumption that the dece-
dent's exposure was similar to those in the study popula-
tions. " ' The trial court must therefore examine whether the
scientific community accepts the process by which the expert
reached his conclusions.1 52 "[W]ithout substituting its judg-
ment for that of the expert," the trial court "should examine
each step in Dr. Sokolowski's reasoning."15 3
As to Dr. Wagoner's testimony, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the Appellate Division's holding that he was
precluded from testifying specifically as to the cause of dece-
dent's cancer.15 4 The Landrigan Court affirmed the Rubanick
holding that an expert does not have to be a physician to tes-
tify as to causation in toxic tort litigation.155 The court stated,
"[t]he ultimate decision whether Dr. Wagoner is qualified to
render an opinion on the issue of specific causation must de-
pend on the trial court's assessment of both his qualifications
and his methodology. '1 5 6
field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony
could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient exper-
tise to offer the intended testimony.
Id. (citing State v. Kelly 478 A.2d 364, 379 (N.J. 1984)).
149. Landrigan, 605 A.2d at 1084. The court stated, "The admissibility of such
testimony depends on the expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles
and to apply those principles to the formulation of his or her opinion. Thus, the key
to admission of the opinion is the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodol-
ogy." Id.
150. Id. at 1087.
151. Id. at 1088.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1088.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1088-89.
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D. Caterinicchio v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.
In Caterinicchio v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,15 a com-
panion case to Landrigan, the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
manded the suit to the trial court to "evaluate the testimony
of plaintiffs experts under the Landrigan standard.'"5  The
plaintiff, Peter Caterinicchio, alleged that his work with as-
bestos products caused him to contract colon cancer and as-
bestosis. 59 The Appellate Division had affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for failure to establish
causation. 16 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision now
requires the trial court to evaluate plaintiff's experts161 consis-
tent with the Landrigan holding.162
V. Federal Level
A. Federal Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 703163 governs the admissibility
of expert testimony and is analogous to New Jersey Rule of
Evidence 56(2). T6 Both rules require that an expert's facts
and data must be of the "type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field." 65 Federal Rule of Evidence
702,166 like New Jersey Rule of Evidence 19,167 requires an ex-
157. 605 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 1992).
158. Id. at 1095.
159. Id. at 1093.
160. Id. at 1094.
161. Dr. Albert Miller, a board certified physician in internal and pulmonary
medicine, testified that Mr. Caterinicchio's colon cancer was causally related to asbes-
tos exposure. Id. at 1093. Additionally, Dr. William J. Nicholson, an industrial hygi-
enist and epidemiologist, testified that a causal relationship exists between asbestos
exposure and colon cancer, but he did not testify as to the cause of plaintiff's cancer.
Id.
162. Id. at 1095.
163. See supra note 25.
164. See supra note 24.
165. FED. R. EvID. 703; N.JR. EVID. 56(2).
166. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
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pert witness to be qualified as an expert by knowledge, experi-
ence, training or education. 168
B. Federal Split
The federal courts are split on whether the trial court
must perform an active or passive review of the reliability of
an expert's testimony. 69
1. Passive Standard
Some federal jurisdictions have adopted a passive ap-
proach to the admission of expert testimony.' These courts
hold that "[e]xpert testimony in toxic tort cases should be
given minimal judicial scrutiny. '1 7' Courts adopting the pas-
sive review standard will admit expert testimony and allow
the opposing party to challenge it at trial.' 72 This creates the
so called "battle of the experts" in which the jury acts as final
arbiter. 173
In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 174 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia adopted the passive review
approach, allowing the jury to evaluate an expert's testimony.
167. See supra note 26.
168. FED. R. EVID. 702; N.J.R. Evm. 19.
169. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-44
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988);
Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 674
(1988); L.L. Plotkin, Note, Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: What is the
Court's Role in Evaluating Expert Testimony?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1990);
Christopher M. Placitella, Toxic-Tort Litigation Shapes New Expert-Witness Role,
126 N.J.L.J. 817, 831 (1990).
170. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D.
Ga. 1985), afl'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986) reh'g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1985); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
171. L.L. Plotkin, Note, Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: What is
the Court's Role in Evaluating Expert Testimony?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (1990).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (defend-
ants were exposed to paraquat and contracted disease soon after).
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The experts in Ferebee were the plaintiff's treating physi-
cians, who held a novel opinion as to the cause of the plain-
tiff's injury.175 The D.C. Circuit held that the question of cau-
sation should be determined by the experts,"1 6 and that the
jury should determine which experts to credit on novel issues
of medical inquiry.1 77 The court reasoned, "[o]n questions
such as [low-level exposure to toxic chemicals], which stand
at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological in-
quiry, if experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it
is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony. 1 78
Chevron, the defendant, argued for the adoption of a "general
acceptance" test.179 In rejecting that argument, the D.C. Cir-
cuit ruled that "a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly
established by animal or epidemiological studies before a doc-
tor can testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship.
exists."180
In Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,81 the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Ferebee stan-
dard in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.18 2
The district court heard conflicting expert opinions on
whether spermicidal jelly that the mother used before she dis-
175. Id. at 1533.
176. Id. at 1535.
177. Id. at 1534.
178. Id. (emphasis in original).
179. The defendant in Ferebee relied on the "general acceptance" test enunci-
ated in Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978). Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535.
180. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535. The court continued:
[a]s long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is
sound, such as use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examination,
products liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statistically signifi-
cant" number of people have been injured or until science has had the time
and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. .
. [T]hat Ferebee's case may have been the first of its exact type, or that his
doctors may have been the first alert enough to recognize such a case, does
not mean that the testimony of those doctors, who are concededly well quali-
fied in their fields, should not have been admitted.
Id. at 1535-36.
181. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
182. Id. at 745.
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covered her pregnancy caused her child's birth defects. 183 The
district court held that plaintiff had established causation.18'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal and held that "it
does not matter in terms of deciding the case that the medical
community might require more research and evidence before
conclusively resolving the question. What matters is that this
particular factfinder found sufficient evidence of causation in
a legal sense in this particular case . .. "185
In United States v. Downing, 86 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ruled on a district court's role in evaluating
scientific methodology.18 7 The Third Circuit held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 requires a district court to evaluate
novel scientific evidence on "(1) the soundness and reliability
of the process or technique used in generating the evidence,
(2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would over-
whelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered con-
nection between the scientific research or test result to be
presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the
case."1 8 A district court must therefore balance its analysis of
the reliability of the expert against the danger that the evi-
dence and testimony may confuse or mislead the jury. 89 The
Frye test190 was rejected for policy reasons.91 The Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not in-
corporate or repudiate the Frye test.192 The court reasoned
183. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266 (N.D. Ga.
1985).
184. Id. at 267.
185. Wells, 788 F.2d at 745.
186. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (expert in the field of human perception and
memory testified concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification in a criminal
trial for mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate transportation of stolen property).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1237.
189. Id. at 1240.
190. The court in Frye stated: "while courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
191. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232.
192. Id. at 1235.
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that the general acceptance standard is a conservative ap-
proach toward admitting scientific evidence and is "at odds
with the spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal
Rules of Evidence."' 9 The court held "that a particular de-
gree of acceptance of a scientific technique within the scien-
tific community is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi-
tion for admissibility;" it is only one factor in a district court's
analysis in determining admissibility.1 9 4
In In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation,195 the plaintiffs
brought a toxic tort action for illnesses contracted as a result
of PCB exposure. 196 The district court had excluded parts of
plaintiffs' expert testimony.197 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed and held that the district court abused
its discretion in excluding parts of the experts' opinions "be-
cause the experts did not have the degree or training which
the district court apparently thought would be most appropri-
ate."' 98 The Third Circuit determined that the district court's
analysis of the expert testimony on novel scientific techniques
was inadequate under the Downing standard,'99 and reasoned
that "in making reliability determinations, courts must err on
the side of admission rather than exclusion."200 The court
stated "'[tihe reliability inquiry . . . [must be] flexible and
may turn on a number of factors. "201
2. Active Standard
Other federal jurisdictions have taken a more active ap-
proach in examining expert testimony.2 02 In determining the
193. Id. at 1237.
194. Id.
195. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
196. Id. at 835.
197. Id. at 855.
198. Id. at 856.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 857.
201. Id. (citing Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238). See supra notes 188-89 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Downing factors.
202. Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d
307, modified on other grounds, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
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admissibility of such testimony, these courts closely examine
the underlying data upon which an expert bases his conclu-
sions.20s Jurisdictions adopting the active review standard
often deem an expert's opinion inadmissible because it does
not have enough support in the scientific community.0 4
In In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,'0
Chief Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York
adopted an active review of the expert's testimony in toxic
tort litigation.206 Chief Judge Weinstein thoroughly reviewed
the expert's data and ruled that it did not support the conclu-
sion that Agent Orange caused the plaintiffs' illnesses.07 The
court held that the expert's testimony was thus inadmissi-
ble. 08 In rejecting the plaintiffs' studies, Judge Weinstein
stated, "[n]one of these studies do more than show that there
may be a causal connection between dioxin [the hazardous
substance in Agent Orange] and disease. 209 None show such a
connection between plaintiffs and Agent Orange." ''"
In Johnston v. United States,211 the United States Dis-
trict Court, District of Kansas, actively reviewed the experts'
1046 (1990); Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823
(D.C. Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (court held testimony of clinical ecologist inadmissible);
Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (court held that a qualified
physician's testimony was inadmissible because his opinion lacked foundation and
reliability); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
203. See L.L. Plotkin, supra note 171, at 1266.
204. See id.
205. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
206. The court stated: "'Rigorous examination' is especially important in the
mass toxic tort context where presentation to the trier of theories of causation de-
pends almost entirely on expert testimony." Id. at 1244. Judge Weinstein continued,
"the court may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if the bases
meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admissibility." Id. at 1245.
"If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no rea-
sonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon
them must be excluded." Id.
207. Id. at 1234.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984).
25
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testimony in a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act"'2 and
rejected plaintiffs' expert testimony.213 The experts testified
that plaintiffs' cancers were causally related to radiation from
their work in an aircraft factory.2 14 The court, however, held
that this testimony was not based on reliable evidence,2" and
reasoned that the experts' testimony did not represent "the
views of the vast majority of competent, respected scientists
in this field," but rather "the views of an extreme minority of
scientists. '21
6
In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 17 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also adopted an active
review of plaintiffs' expert testimony.213 The court addressed
the issue of whether Bendectin caused plaintiffs' daughter's
birth defects. 21 9 Each side presented experts who disagreed
about the theory of causation.2 20 The Fifth Circuit, in adopt-
ing the active review standard, stated "[clonfronted, as we
now are, with difficult medical questions, courts must criti-
cally evaluate the reasoning process by which the experts con-
nect data to their conclusions in order for courts to consist-
ently and rationally resolve the disputes before them. '221 In
adopting the approaches of the In re "Agent Orange" Product
Liability Litigation2 2 and Richardson by Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc.2 23 courts,2 2 4 the Fifth Circuit held "that
the Brocks did not present sufficient evidence regarding cau-
sation to allow a trier of fact to make a reasonable inference
that Bendectin caused Rachel Brock's limb reduction
212. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
213. See Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 383.
214. Id. at 379-83.
215. Id. at 410.
216. Id. at 410-11.
217. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified on other grounds, 884 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
218. See id. at 312-15.
219. Id. at 308.
220. Id. at 312-15.
221. Id. at 309-10.
222. See discussion supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
223. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989). See discus-
sion infra notes 226-33 and accompanying text.
224. See Brock, 874 F.2d at 310-11.
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defect."""5
In Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the testimony of
plaintiffs' principal witness on causation.2 6 The court rejected
the expert's contention that Bendectin caused plaintiffs'
child's birth defects.22 The district court determined that
there was not a "battle of the experts. 2 2 8 If it had been a
"battle of the experts," the district court would have followed
its decision in Ferebee and allowed the jury to determine
which expert to credit.229 In affirming the court below, the
D.C. Circuit distinguished its passive approach in Ferebee as
only applying to issues which are novel and "stand at the
frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry. "230
It stated "[i]f experts are willing to testify to causation in
such situations and their methodology is sound, the jury's ver-
dict should not be disturbed.2321 The D.C. Circuit distin-
guished this case from Ferebee because it did not involve
novel theories of causation and, therefore, the court applied
the active review model.2 - 2 The court reasoned that it does not
have to "accept uncritically any sort of opinion espoused by
an expert merely because his credentials render him qualified
to testify. 233
In Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp.,34 the toxic tort
plaintiff attempted to establish medical causation through the
testimony of one expert witness.2 5 In determining the validity
of the expert's methodology, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, ap-
plied the Frye test, which requires general acceptance of the
225. Id. at 315.
226. See 857 F.2d at 829-31.
227. Id. at 829.
228. Id. at 826.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 832 (emphasis in original).
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 829.
234. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
235. Id. at 1108. "Dr. Miller is not an expert in either oncology or pathology." Id.
at 1112. "[His] experience with cancer occurred during his residency when he assisted
in a study of the immune system as affected by smoking and asbestos." Id.
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methodology within the scientific community.2 36 The Fifth
Circuit held the opinion inadmissible because it lacked gen-
eral support in the scientific community,237 and stated, "the
district court was within its discretion in concluding, albeit
implicitly, that Dr. Miller's testimony failed to meet ... the
Frye test. '2" The dissent charged the majority with amending
the Federal Rules of Evidence to "tilt toxic tort litigation in
favor of defendants. 2 9
VI. Analysis
The Rubanick standard permits an expert to testify as to
novel theories of causation provided that two criteria are met:
first, the expert must be "sufficiently qualified by education,
knowledge, training, and experience in the specific field of sci-
ence,"240 and, second, the opinion must be based on "sound,
adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and
information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the
scientific field." '24 This broad standard differs from the stan-
dard established by the D.C. Circuit in Frye, which requires
an expert's opinion to have achieved "general acceptance"
within the scientific community.
The "general acceptance" standard, as applied in Kelly,
Windmere, and Frye, requires plaintiffs to establish that their
experts' opinions are commonly held by other experts in the
field. This standard precludes testimony on emerging theories
of causation. Under the "general acceptance" standard, a
knowledgeable doctor who recognizes a probable causal link
between a toxin and an injury or disease can be precluded
from testifying as to his opinion of causation. The Rubanick
standard, however, allows such testimony from a qualified ex-
pert if the theory is based on a sound methodology involving
236. Id. at 1115.
237. Id. at 1116.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1138.
240. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 748 (N.J. 1991).
241. Id. at 747-48.
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data reasonably relied on by other experts., 2 Opposing coun-
sel is then given the opportunity to rebut the expert's claim
through cross-examination and by calling rebuttal experts.
In Rubanick, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the
Ferebee approach in evaluating the admissibility of expert ev-
idence in toxic tort litigation.2 48 This approach, referenced
here as "passive review," makes it easier for plaintiffs to have
expert witnesses testify on new scientific theories of causation
because it recognizes the difficulties inherent in proving cau-
sation in toxic tort cases. Thus, the Rubanick approach allows
the admittance of novel scientific theories,24 ' including theo-
ries which "stand at the frontier of current medical and epi-
demiological inquiry. '" 45 The evolution of and improvements
in litigation techniques have resulted in an increased use of
novel and complex scientific evidence to support theories of
causation.246 The Rubanick court, like the courts in Ferebee
and In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, recognized that
well-qualified experts should be allowed to testify about novel
theories of causation. Thus, this standard will help plaintiffs
by allowing the admittance of emerging scientific theories that
bolster their claims of causation.
The Rubanick approach is broader still than standards
enunciated by other "passive review" courts. In Rubanick, the
testifying expert, Dr. Balis, was a non-physician and had
neither treated nor examined the plaintiff.2 47 Yet, this did not
preclude him from testifying as to his opinion of the cause of
plaintiff's illness.2" 8 In fact, the Rubanick and Landrigan deci-
sions permit a non-physician to testify as to causation in toxic
tort litigation, provided he is qualified and his methodology is
sound.24 9 Although the Rubanick court remanded the determi-
242. See id. at 747-48.
243. Id. at 750.
244. See id. at 747-48.
245. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (em-
phasis in original), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
246. See GRzE & FREEDMAN, supra note 10, 5.1-5.3.
247. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 735.
248. See id. at 749-50.
249. See Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1088-89 (N.J. 1992). One
commentator has noted, "Until [the Appellate Division's holding in] Rubanick, there
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nation of the admissibility of Dr. Balis's testimony, it did not
conceal its view on the matter.15 0
An expert with a novel theory of causation will most
likely testify against other credible experts. This creates the
so-called "battle of the experts." In Rubanick, Dr. Balis, who
holds a Ph.D in biochemistry, testified against three other ex-
perts: a licensed physician who is also a board certified inter-
nist; a Ph.D in toxicology; and an expert epidemiologist."' In
such cases, each side has the opportunity to present all of its
evidence. The jury then makes its own independent determi-
nation of whether to credit the expert.
There is a fear that experts, regardless of the facts, will
testify as is required to prove the client's case. One commen-
tator has stated: "[tihe scientific community is large and het-
erogenous, and a Ph.D. can be found to swear to almost any
'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish." 52 The
Rubanick standard attempts to prevent this, however, by re-
quiring a showing that the expert possesses sufficient qualifi-
cations and that his theory is based on data relied on by other
experts. And, if an expert does offer a foolish opinion, oppos-
ing counsel then has the opportunity to cross-examine and of-
fer rebuttal experts.
At least three significant concerns offer a persuasive argu-
ment for the adoption of the Rubanick standard and its pas-
sive review of expert testimony, and for a retreat from the
more restrictive "general acceptance" standard followed by
was no reported New Jersey decision permitting a non-physician to testify to the
condition or cause of human disease in any single clinical situation." Christopher M.
Placitella, Toxic-Tort Litigation Shapes New Expert- Witness Role, 126 N.J.L.J. 817,
820 (1990).
250. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 749-50. The court stated:
We are in complete agreement with Judge Petrella's observation below: "It
may be argued that by virtue of his specialization and research background
in cancer [Dr. Balis] was more qualified than a medical doctor who is in-
volved with the care and treatment after the fact of cancer development in
patients, and including certain of the experts produced by Monsanto."
Id. at 749.
251. Id. at 735-37.
252. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 277, 333 (1985).
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courts which actively review the admittance of expert testi-
mony. First, courts which adopt the "general acceptance"
standard may prevent a jury from hearing all of the plaintiff's
available evidence, and may in fact prevent the plaintiff from
successfully maintaining his suit. Second, such a standard in-
fringes on the jury's role as fact finder by removing pertinent
testimony from its consideration. And, third, when a court
rules as a matter of law that an expert's opinion is inadmissi-
ble, it may undermine emerging scientific theories of
causation.
The Rubanick standard will admit novel theories of cau-
sation, so long as those theories come from a qualified expert
who bases his opinion on data used by other experts in the
field.2 58 Under Rubanick, the court's role is to determine
"whether the expert's opinion is derived from a sound and
well-founded methodology that is supported by some expert
consensus in the appropriate field."215 Under this standard,
emerging scientific theories of causation are not precluded,
and plaintiffs are able to produce all available evidence. The
Rubanick standard thus recognizes and eases the difficult bur-
den of proving causation in toxic tort litigation.
While Rubanick implicitly rejects the restrictive general
acceptance standard in favor of a passive review standard, the
Landrigan case attempts to further define that standard.
Landrigan explains that the trial court must examine the "va-
lidity of the expert's reasoning and methodology" - his abil-
ity to explain and apply scientific principles in formulating his
opinion as to causation.2 55
Landrigan requires that, in determining the admissibility
of an expert's opinion, a trial court should look at the studies
which the expert relied on in formulating his opinion. Landri-
gan seems to diverge from Rubanick, and appears to adopt
the twin reliability analyses of the Third Circuit, in requiring
separate reliability determinations for the methodologies un-
derlying both the scientific information relied on, and the rea-
253. Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 747-48.
254. Landrigan, 605 A.2d at 1086 (citing Rubanick, 593 A.2d at 449-50).
255. Landrigan, 605 A.2d at 1084.
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soning adopted by the expert in formulating his opinion. Ex-
plicitly in Landrigan, the court states in its remand
instructions that the trial court must evaluate both the valid-
ity of the studies relied on by the expert, as well as the ex-
pert's assumptions about those studies.256 Therefore under
Landrigan, not only must the court determine whether the
methodology behind the studies relied on is sound, it must
also determine whether the methodology behind the formula-
tion of the expert's opinion is sound.
VII. Conclusion
Other jurisdictions should follow the lead of the
Rubanick and Landrigan decisions because plaintiffs' difficult
burden of proving causation in toxic tort litigation requires
the use of a broad standard in determining the admissibility
of expert testimony. Jurors should be allowed to consider all
reliable evidence, including novel opinions which are based on
sound scientific methodology and espoused by qualified ex-
perts. Courts should simply evaluate an expert's qualifications
and determine whether an opinion is based on the type of
data which is "relied on by experts in the scientific field. '15 7
Public policy dictates that plaintiffs should have an op-
portunity to prove the source of their illnesses. Science has
historically been slow to accept emerging scientific theories,25 8
and plaintiffs should not be penalized by the inevitable pas-
sage of time. Likewise, the jury's fact-finding role is an inte-
gral part of our judiciary system, and plaintiffs and defend-
ants have the right to present all reliable evidence to a jury.
The trial court's role in evaluating expert testimony should
therefore be limited to a determination of whether the witness
is a qualified expert, and an evaluation of the expert's meth-
odology to determine if it is well-founded and the data is of
the type used by other experts in determining causation.
The trial court's exploration should stop there. When a
"battle of the experts" exists, a jury should be permitted to
256. Id. at 1088.
257. Id.
258. See Brennan, supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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hear all of the reliable evidence available, and to then deter-
mine which expert to accept or reject. Emerging scientific
opinion, if proffered by a qualified expert and based on data
used by other experts, will assist the jury in its decision-mak-
ing process. Judges who attempt to intrude on the role of the
jury as fact finder by independently reviewing the thought
processes underlying the formulation of expert opinions may
deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to seek redress for their
injuries. Therefore, courts should follow the standard enunci-
ated in Rubanick and Landrigan, so far as those decisions
broaden the criteria regarding the admissibility of expert evi-
dence in toxic tort litigation, and let the jury decide - let it
be the trier of fact.
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